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"SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" AND COMITY: STATE OR
FEDERAL FORUM FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
IN POST CONVICTION PROCEDURES?
Edwin W. Gockley was convicted of second degree murder on
September 27, 1961, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' On August 7, 1964, Gockley filed
a petition for federal habeas corpus alleging that his confession ad-
mitted into evidence at trial was involuntary. After an unfortunate
five year delay, this petition was finally directed to a federal district
court for a hearing on the merits. However, the decision in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, remanding the case to
the district court for the hearing, is a confusing explanation for the
court's action in light of the law governing forum selection for post
conviction evidentiary hearings.
The history of Gockley's petition presents a regrettable picture
of delays and errors. Two months after the petition was first filed,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania denied both the petition and Gockley's request for appointment of
counsel, but granted a certificate of probable cause for appeal. The
Third Circuit appointed counsel on February 19, 1965, but the ap-
pointed counsel did nothing for over a year and a half. His appoint-
ment was then vacated and new counsel was designated.2
With his new counsel, Gockley appealed the denial of his original
petition. The Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court
for an evidentiary hearing for the stated purpose of determining
whether Gockley had waived his right to challenge the admission of
the incriminating statements on the grounds of involuntariness.3 Pur-
suant to this directive, the district court on remand found there had
been no waiver. The court first held that Jackson v. Denno 4 (applied
retroactively to Gockley's trial ') gave Gockley the right to have the
voluntariness of his confession determined by a tribunal other than the
one considering his guilt." At the time of Gockley's trial Pennsylvania
did not have this safeguard; under Pennsylvania law-as in the New
York procedure struck down in Jackson-the voluntariness of the
confession was submitted to the jury along with the question of guilt.'
1 Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963).
2 United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 411 F2d 216, 218 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 847 (1969).
3 United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378 F2d 398 (3d Cir. 1967).
4378 U.S. 368 (1964).
6 The Jackson holding is retroactive. See, e.g., Senk v. Pennsylvania, 378 U.S.
562 (1964) (per curiam) ; Oister v. Pennsylvania, 378 U.S. 568 (1964) (per curiam).
0 United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 276 F. Supp. 748, 752 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
rezvd on other grounds, 411 F2d 216 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
This procedure has been modified to conform to the Jackson rule. PA. R. Cam.
P. 323(f).
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Since Gockley was never given an opportunity for an independent
determination of voluntariness, the court concluded that he could not
have intelligently waived his right to object to the admissibility of his
confession at trial.8 Thus, a violation of the right could properly be
alleged in a petition for habeas corpus. Also citing Jackson, however,
the court decided that the hearing should be held in a state court,
On another appeal, stemming from this last ruling, the court of
appeals agreed that there had been no waiver but, reversing the district
court, held that the determination of voluntariness should take place
in a federal court.'0 Although recognizing that comity normally would
require referral to the state, the court found that Gockley was excepted
from this requirement and thus that a federal hearing was required."
This Comment analyzes the court's decision to except Gockley's case
from the comity doctrine.
Federal courts have the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person held in state custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion.'2 This power includes authority to hold an evidentiary hearing
if the judge finds the state court record to be inadequate under certain
specific statutory criteria.' 3 Consistent with this requirement that a
federal hearing supplement state proceedings, the statute further pro-
vides that any federal action shall be deferred until the petitioner has
exhausted his state remedies.'4 But the legislation also codifies a
Supreme Court case which stated that the doctrine of exhaustion is
one of comity, not jurisdiction.' 5 Thus federal courts may ignore the
exhaustion requirement when there exist "circumstances rendering such
process [at the state level] ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner." "
8 276 F. Supp. at 752.
9 Id. at 753.
1 0United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 411 F.2d 216 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 847 (1969).
11 Id. at 219.
1228 U.S.C. §2241 (1964), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §2241(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
1328 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. IV, 1969). This section provides that the evidence
as adduced at the state level shall be deemed correct unless it appears that (1) the
merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state court hearing; (2) the
factfinding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full
and fair hearing; (3) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state
court hearing; (4) the state court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the state court proceeding; (5) the applicant was an
indigent and the state court failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the state
court proceeding; (6) the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing
in the state court; (7) the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
state court; or (8) the federal court, having considered that part of the record which
is said to support the disputed factual issue, concludes that the factual determination
contained therein is not fairly supported by the record. These provisions essentially
codify the criteria established in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
1428 U.S.C. §§2254(b)-(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
15Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
1628 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (Supp. IV, 1969). The relevant language was first enacted
in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 967. Judicial development
both before and after the enactment of the statute recognized the special circum-
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The court of appeals in Gockley did ignore this requirement, and
held that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing in the federal district
court on the voluntariness of his confession, notwithstanding the
availability of a state remedy under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction
Hearing Act. 7 Although the court's conclusion is correct, its reason-
ing is clouded with unconvincing arguments which detract from the
strongest point of the decision.
A. United States ex rel. Singer v. Myers
First, the majority incorrectly relied on the recent Supreme Court
decision in United States ex rel. Singer v. Myers,'8 which reversed
in a brief per curiam opinion the Third Circuit's denial of a habeas
corpus petition. A sketch of the history of the Singer case is necessary
to see the Third Circuit's error.
In Singer, the district court first faced with the petition held a
hearing and determined from the record that as a matter of federal law
Singer's confession was involuntary.'" Thus, no facts were at issue
in the case. However, the Third Circuit, citing Jackson v. Denno 20
and Case v. Nebraska,"' reversed the action of the district court
granting the hearing, thus obliging the petitioner to take his case to
the Pennsylvania state courts for a hearing on the voluntariness of
his petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act,
which became effective in March 1966-after his appeals in the state
courts.2 ' The Supreme Court in turn reversed this appellate action
in a cryptic opinion providing no rationale other than citations to
Jackson and Roberts v. LaVallee.' However, an investigation of
these cases does afford an explanation for the Court's action.
Jackson v. Denno held that a criminal defendant is constitutionally
entitled to have the voluntariness of his confession determined by a
tribunal other than the jury which will determine his guilt or innocence.
But Jackson also held that, since there were disputed issues of fact
which would determine whether the confession was indeed voluntary
and since the state had an interest in passing on these issues, the
hearing to which Jackson was entitled should be held in state court.2 4
stances exception to the exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306
U.S. 19, 27 (1939) ; Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F2d 939, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; United
States v. Follette, 275 F. Supp. 548, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
17 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to -14 (Supp. 1969).
18392 U.S. 647 (1968).
IgUnited States e.z rel. Singer v. Myers, 260 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1966),
vacated, 384 F.2d 279 (1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 647 (1968).
20 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
21381 U.S. 336 (1965).
22 United States ex rel. Singer v. Myers, 384 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd,
392 U.S. 647 (1968).
2 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
24 378 U.S. at 392-96.
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Thus, by citing Jackson in its opinion in Singer, the Supreme Court
was pointing out that in Singer no facts were in dispute and referral
to the state courts was unnecessary.
This interpretation of the Singer Court's intention receives addi-
tional support from an examination of Roberts v. LaVallee. In
Roberts, the question presented by the habeas corpus petition was
whether an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript of a pre-
liminary hearing. Roberts had raised the issue in an unsuccessful
attempt to appeal his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals.
In reversing the Second Circuit's decision to remit Roberts to the New
York courts for his remedy (New York had since held that in such a
case a defendant was entitled to a transcript "), the Supreme Court
stated that since Roberts had once exhausted his state remedies on
precisely the issue then being considered, and because the issue was
predetermined by federal law,26 repetitious state appeals were not
necessary. The Court found no state interest in a further hearing on
an issue already settled as a matter of law. Thus the Singer Court's
citation to Roberts, together with the citation to Jackson, was intended
to indicate that remission of a petitioner to a state court is unjustified
when factual issues are not in dispute.
Given this interpretation of Singer, the Gockley majority's reliance
on the case to justify a federal hearing is misplaced. The facts sur-
rounding Gockley's confession were in dispute and not fully developed
at the state level ;27 the record of the proceedings below was insufficient
to support a legal conclusion concerning the voluntariness of Gockley's
confession.
The situations in Singer and Gockley can also be distinguished
on the basis of the procedures the petitioners went through before
applying to the federal courts. Unlike Gockley, Singer attempted to
have his confession considered under the old Pennsylvania habeas
corpus proceedings and was turned down by the appellate courts.28
Under the doctrine of Brown v. Allen, I a petitioner need only present
his issue once before the highest state court in order to have exhausted
his state remedies within the meaning of section 2254.30 Thus, if
before passage of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Act a petitioner
had been denied a state hearing, arguably his state remedies were
exhausted, even though he might obtain a hearing after passage of the
Act. In Gockley, however, this argument is unavailable, since the
25People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y2d 993, 224 N.E.2d 730, 278 N.Y.S.2d 226
(1966).
26389 U.S. at 42; see Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
27411 F.2d at 218.
2 8 Commonwealth ex rel. Singer v. Myers, 206 Pa. Super. 559, 213 A2d 685
(1965) (allocatur refused by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania).
29344 U.S. 443 (1953).
3o Id. at 447; see text accompanying note 16 supra.
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state supreme court was never presented with the voluntariness issue.
Thus Singer cannot be the basis for a federal evidentiary hearing for
Gockley.
B. Crossing the Threshold
The Gockley court also reasoned that because the district court
held a hearing and determined that Gockley had not waived his right
to object to the use of his statements, "[t]he Federal courts .
crossed the threshold to the issue of voluntariness," " and should
therefore determine that issue as well. This argument fails on two
grounds. First, the federal courts have been most ingenious in re-
ferring cases to the states for failure to exhaust state remedies, even
after hearings have been held in the district court.2 There is no
threshold beyond which the federal courts have been compelled to deter-
mine an issue. Second, the issue of waiver is a question which may
properly be given consideration by a federal court before a case is
sent back to the state for an evidentiary hearing, since there is no
compelling. reason to have the issues decided together. The two issues
can be severed with only minor procedural problems. Thus the court's
"threshold" argument also fails to justify the federal hearing.
C. Ineffective Remedy
The court's primary ground for decision was a "special circum-
stances" rationale.3 3 Essentially, the court felt that the petitioner had
waited too long for his relief to justify another journey to the state
courts.
The appropriateness of this approach depends upon the court's in-
terpretation of the special circumstances rationale-an interpretation
unfortunately not made clear. The articulated basis for the court's
action is that:
The requirement that a habeas corpus applicant exhaust
his State court remedies, now embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
is a principle of comity and does not rise to jurisdictional
proportions. If the case is sufficiently exceptional the doc-
trine need not be rigidly followed to the point of inflicting
manifest injustice. 4
Perhaps these words mean that the court was acting in con-
formity with section 2254(b), finding no need for exhaustion because
of "the existence of circumstances rendering [state] process ineffective
31411 F2d at 219.
2 E.g., Henderson v. Dutton, 397 F2d 375 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Mitchell v. Stephens,
353 F2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965). Contra, Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967);
Pope v. Harper, 407 F2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1969).
33 411 F.2d at 219.
34 Id.
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to protect the rights of the prisoner." However, this is unlikely for
several reasons.
Initially, it should be noted that the court did not expressly
follow the statute. It would be unusual for a court to rely upon
statutory language without reference to that language. But even if
the court intended to be interpreting the statute, the facts of Gockley do
not fit within its language.
First, the Gockley court may have been looking to the five year
delay prior to the instant proceeding to justify a finding of "ineffective-
ness." However, since section 2254(b) requires the federal court to
determine whether an available state proceeding will afford petitioner
"effective" protection of his rights, past proceedings and delay should
be relevant only when they shed light on the probable effectiveness of
future state proceedings. It is no doubt true that prior delay in the
state system may well indicate that more delay in the same system is
likely; the state proceeding will presumably take longer than the
federal proceeding, and thus the state proceeding will be relatively
ineffective in protecting petitioner's rights. But Gockley was delayed
five years while in the federal system; this delay is irrelevant in
assessing the delay likely to be experienced on return to the state.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the delay in Gockley should
be taken as evidence that the federal court is slow in its relief and that
the state procedure should, in this instance, be preferred.
Perhaps it could be argued that any future delay is relevant in
determining whether section 2254(b) applies, insofar as a state court
might take longer in affording relief to a petitioner than would a
federal court. This interpretation considers only the possible delay
after the case has been returned to the state. It is not concerned
with delay experienced prior to the instant federal proceeding. In
such a situation, one might say that the state remedy, because so slow
to materialize, is "ineffective." But even assuming this to be a proper
reading of the statutory language, it would not justify the result in
Gockley. The Gockley court offered no evidence that relief for peti-
tioner upon referral to the state would take longer than if the case
were kept in a federal court. Furthermore, a concern for future delay,
even if such delay were provable, would be an unwise basis for deci-
sion. It may be true that in almost all cases a petitioner already in
federal court will obtain relief somewhat more quickly by remaining
in federal court than by starting again in the state system. However, if
this possibility justified dispensing with the exhaustion requirement,
then the exception to section 2254(b) would become the rule, and the
congressional attempt to prevent federal courts from entering a con-
troversy until the state had an adequate opportunity to deal with it
would be futile.
Finally, one might argue that in a case involving egregious past
delay plus the prospect of future delay in moving to the state forum,
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remitting a petitioner to the state court would render the whole pro-
ceeding an ineffective remedy.
However, since, as shown above, the separate elements should
not properly be considered in determining effectiveness, this is essen-
tially a "fairness" argument and is treated as such in the succeeding
section.
D. Special Circumstances
A more likely interpretation of what the court was doing focuses
on the intent of Congress in passing section 2254. The Gockley court
stated that the exhaustion requirement now embodied in section 2254
is one of comity, not jurisdiction.35 Implicit in this statement is the
suggestion that the statute did not set forth all possible exceptions to
the exhaustion rule, and thus federal courts are not required to act
only within the strict statutory framework. It is clear that relief is in
order if the facts fall within the statutory exception. But if the inter-
pretation suggested here is correct, then even if the circumstances do
not fit the statutory exceptions (as in Gockley), the court is free to
consider whether relief should be granted. In other words, by em-
bodying the "comity" concept, the statute leaves some discretion in
federal judges to deal with situations not within the specific statutory
exceptions. 36
Given the background of section 2254, this reading is entirely
plausible. The section was enacted to codify the exhaustion doctrine
developed by the Supreme Court;3 an important part of that doc-
trine was the principle that the exhaustion requirement imposed no
jurisdictional barrier to a grant of habeas corpus relief. The require-
ment was merely a recognition that it was wise to defer to a state
court remedy when such relief was availableY Thus, although the
statutory exception was undoubtedly fashioned to cover the vast
majority of cases, there is good reason to believe that it should not be
read as exclusive: There is nothing to indicate that Congress intended
to tighten the exhaustion doctrine from the status of comity to the
strictness of jurisdiction.
Examination of the "exceptional circumstances" cases which have
arisen subsequent to the enactment of section 2254 reinforces this
35 Id.
31 A similar process of statutory interpretation was used by the Court of Claims
in a tax case. Compare American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 399
F2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968), with INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 334(b) (2).
37This doctrine has been set out in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944).
The House report on section 2254 states: "This new section is declaratory of existing
law as affirmed by the Supreme Court (See Ex parte Hawk, 1944, 64 S. Ct. 448,
321 U.S. 114, 88 L.Ed. 572)." H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 180 (1947).
38The doctrine that federal courts had the power to act prior to state proceedings
but should only do so in special circumstances was established in Ex parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241 (1886). See also Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183 (1892); In re Wood,
140 U.S. 278 (1891).
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interpretation. Virtually none of these cases speak in terms of the
statutory language. References to section 2254 are made in passing,
with no attempt strictly to apply the particular statutory language.
Typical of this approach is Bacom v. Sullivan. 9 Petitioner had
not applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
after the Florida Supreme Court dismissed his appeal in a state habeas
proceeding. The court found "unique and extraordinary circum-
stances" sufficient to merit federal review. In articulating the special
circumstances exception, the court said:
The rule just referred to, however, [exhaustion of state
remedies] is not an inflexible one. In the Darr case, at 339
U.S. 210 [1950], it is further said: "Ex parte Hawk, 321
U.S. 114 [1944], prescribes only what should 'ordinarily'
be the proper procedure; all the cited cases from Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241 [1886], to Hawk recognize that much
cannot be foreseen, and that 'special circumstances' justify
departure from rules designed to regulate the usual case. The
exceptions are few but they exist. Other situations may de-
velop." Thus it appears that the general rule of the Darr case
is not intended as an absolute."'
No reference was made to section 2254.41
Although most of the special circumstances cases have adhered
to the statutory standard without articulating its applicability,4' the
Gockley court's excursion beyond the statute is not unprecedented.
In Bacom, the court was in part motivated to grant relief because
petitioner's post conviction proceedings had been going on for four
years.4 3 In Dove v. Peyton.,4 the court granted relief even though
petitioner had not urged one of the grounds for relief upon the state
courts. The court said:
[W]e think all of the grounds now urged, with one exception,
were put before the State court on the criminal appeal and
overruled. The exception is the complaint about the adjourn-
ment of the criminal trial. For this single omission Dove
39194 F2d 166 (5th Cir. 1952).
40Id. at 167.
41See also Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Ross v. Middle-
brooks, 188 F2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Johnson v. Walker, 199 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. La.
1961); Soulia v. O'Brien, 91 F. Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1950). But see Thomas v.
Teets, 205 F2d 236 (9th Cir. 1953).
At the time Bacom was decided, the language of § 2254 concerning exceptions
to the exhaustion requirement was identical to the present statutory language.
Compare 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Supp. V, 1952), with 28 U.S.C. §§2254(b)-(c) (Supp.
IV, 1969) ; see note 16 supra.
42 See, e.g., Mobley v. Dutton, 380 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1967) ; United States ex rel.
Grabousky v. Myers, 229 F. Supp. 702 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
43194 F2d at 168.
44343 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1965).
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should not be required to retrace his steps through the State
courts.
45
Inconvenience to petitioner is indeed unfortunate, but it is not a
statutory exception to the exhaustion doctrine.
The Gockley court did not go very far beyond the statute.
Gockley does not stand for the broad proposition that whenever a
petitioner can show delay in his proceedings, the exhaustion require-
ment need not be met. The court was precise in its description of
the circumstances justifying relief:
It would be grossly unjust to the petitioner at this stage of the
case to render nugatory all of the proceedings in the Federal
courts on the ground that he failed to exhaust his state reme-
dies, which if it was a barrier should have been evident
when his petition was filed almost five years ago.4'
The court also referred to "the lack of a serious claim by the Com-
monwealth on the availability of state remedies" 4 as a factor com-
bining with the lapse of time to justify relief. Thus the court pointed
to a particular situation as appropriate for relief: Where petitioner's
substantial delay in obtaining relief results from the failure of the
state to raise the exhaustion issue in the first place and the failure of
the courts adequately to deal with it, the state and the federal courts
should be precluded from using the exhaustion doctrine to delay peti-
tioner further. The Gockley case presents a very narrow venture
beyond the confines of section 2254.
But given that the court's opinion rests upon a discretionary
finding of unusual circumstances not strictly authorized by statute, the
appropriateness of the court's result depends upon whether this discre-
tion was wisely exercised. One major criticism of the wisdom of the
decision which could be made is that it contravenes a strong policy
in favor of utilizing available state post conviction remedies. In
response to a call from the Supreme Court of the United States for
increased state post conviction remedies,48 many states have passed
statutes providing hearings in which state prisoners can assert their
constitutional claims.4" As a result, the ever-increasing burden on the
federal courts of many habeas corpus petitions ' should be lightened.
45 Id. at 213.
46 411 F2d at 219.
47 Id.
48 Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at
346-47 (Brennan, J., concurring) ; Young v. Ragan, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
4 9 E.g., ILT. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to -7 (Smith-Hurd 1964), as amended,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 & -4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 29-3001 to -3004 (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to -14 (Supp.
1969).
oH.R. REP. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-35 (1966).
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Accordingly, when interpreting section 2254(c), which provides:
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the reme-
dies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the
right under the law of the state to raise, by any available pro-
cedure, the question presented,
the courts have held that failure to act under available state post
conviction statutes is a basis for denying a federal habeas corpus
petition.P1 This construction of the statute gives the greatest effect
to state statutes having a potentially beneficial effect on federal-state
relations. Furthermore, to allow the states to correct any errors in
their criminal processes before burdening the federal court is good
judicial policy. 2
However, the Gockley court's narrow holding does not signifi-
cantly contravene that interest and is supported by strong policy. Cer-
tainly this sort of special circumstances exception to the exhaustion
doctrine will encourage state courts to offer their criminal defendants
a fair and prompt disposal of their claims in order to avoid having the
matter taken out of state hands. The states will be very careful to
assert all the grounds in defense to a habeas corpus petition at an early
stage. The exception will in no way discourage use of or adoption of
post conviction remedies by the states, since the states are assured that
in the vast majority of cases, their procedure will be allowed full
operation.m The extra burden imposed on federal courts is likely to
be slight, since few cases will present the requisite facts. Most impor-
tant, petitioner now avoids reentry onto the state procedure treadmill
leading ultimately to a hearing on voluntariness. Instead, he remains
in the federal system and receives a quick and expeditious hearing on
voluntariness.' Individual justice has been done at no expense to
principles of federalism."5
5 lE.g., Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) ; United States ex rel. Rybarik v.
Maroney, 406 F2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969) ; Chavez v. Baker, 399 F2d 943 (10th Cir.
1968) ; Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel.
Anderson v. Rundle, 393 F2d 635 (3d Cir. 1968); Gray v. Wingo, 391 F.2d 268
(6th Cir. 1967). But see Morgan v. Tennessee, 298 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
52 Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F2d 731, 735-40 (5th Cir. 1968).
The one drawback to this approach is the vast discretion it vests with the
federal judge. Merely by labeling a case "special," the judge can take control of the
evidentiary hearing. However, this is not an exorbitant price to pay for the flexible
opportunity to do justice which the approach offers.
54The court's answer to the special circumstances presented in Gockley assumes
that the federal hearing will take place more rapidly than a corresponding state
hearing. This would certainly be a relevant consideration in a court's decision on
where to hold a hearing. Evidence rebutting this assumption would give the state a
powerful argument for asserting control over the case.
5 5 judge Biggs's dissent reasons that since the delay was caused by appointed
counsel and not the state, the state ought not to be charged with the burdens of this
delay. 411 F2d at 224. However, where the blame for delay is to rest is
irrelevant once it has been determined that the blame does not lie with the petitioner.
A blameless petitioner should not be burdened by anyone else's fault.
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CONCLUSION
In Gockley, the strong policy favoring resolution of issues via state
post conviction procedures yields neither to a general rule concerning
evidentiary hearings nor to a statutory mandate, but to the specific
policy considerations of an individual case. The weakness of the deci-
sion lies in its failure properly to justify its result. By discussing
Singer and the "threshhold" rationale, the court detracts from and
clouds what this Comment asserts is the real issue-application of a
special circumstances test. Moreover, its use of that test, although
proper, is diluted by the failure to articulate its approach adequately.
Gockley offers hope for those petitioners caught in a web of procedural
delay. But its significance depends upon the extent to which future
courts are able to pierce the veiled reasoning on which that hope rests.
